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Essay 
Should the Supreme Court Fear 
Congress? 
Neal Devins† 
Over the past two years, Congress has considered propos-
als to strip federal courts of jurisdiction over same-sex mar-
riage,1 the Pledge of Allegiance,2 judicial invocations of interna-
tional law,3 the public display of the Ten Commandments,4 and 
legal challenges filed by “enemy combatants.”5 And while none 
of these proposals were enacted,6 some of them were approved 
by the House of Representatives.7 More striking, Congress ex-
pressed its disapproval of state court decision making in the 
Terri Schiavo case by expanding federal court jurisdiction.8 
Specifically, rather than accept state court findings that Terri 
Schiavo, then in a persistent vegetative state,9 would rather die 
 
†  Goodrich Professor of Law and Professor of Government, College of 
William and Mary. Thanks to Keith Whittington for helpful suggestions. 
 1. Marriage Protection Act, H.R. 3313, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 2. Pledge Protection Act, H.R. 2028, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 3. Reaffirmation of American Independence Resolution, H.R. Res. 568, 
108th Cong. (2004). 
 4. Ten Commandments Defense Act, H.R. 2045, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 5. See Eric Schmitt, Senate Approves Limiting Rights of U.S. Detainees, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2005, at A1. 
 6. Congress, however, did enact legislation limiting federal court juris-
diction in cases involving detainees at Guantánamo Bay. In its final form, this 
legislation was not a rebuke of the Supreme Court for its decision in Rasul v. 
Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), allowing habeas filings by enemy combatants. Id. 
at 484. Congress, instead, sought to balance judicial independence concerns 
with the military’s need not to be bogged down defending frivolous lawsuits. 
For additional discussion, see infra notes 59–60 and accompanying text. 
 7. The House approved proposals to strip the federal courts of jurisdic-
tion in cases involving same-sex marriage and the Pledge of Allegiance. See 
supra notes 1–2. 
 8. An Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. 
No. 109-3, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. (119 Stat.) 15. 
 9. According to CNN, lower courts ruled that she was in a persistent 
vegetative state. Schiavo’s Feeding Tube Removed, CNN.COM, Mar. 18, 2005, 
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than be kept alive artificially, Congress asked the federal 
courts to sort out whether the removal of a feeding tube vio-
lated Ms. Schiavo’s constitutional rights.10 
The specter of lawmakers expressing their disapproval of 
court decision making through retaliatory legislation seems 
more real today than it has since Congress pursued jurisdic-
tion-stripping measures against the Warren Court in the late 
1950s.11 In addition to jurisdiction-altering proposals and legis-
lation, Congress enacted legislation requiring that records be 
kept of judges who made downward departures of Sentencing 
Commission guidelines,12 and debated the creation of an officer 
of “inspector general” to monitor federal court decision mak-
ing.13 Commenting on how this dramatic increase in the criti-
cism of judges has exacerbated “the strained relationship be-
tween the Congress and the federal Judiciary,” Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist spoke, in January 2005, of his “hope that 
the Supreme Court and all of our courts will continue to com-
mand sufficient public respect to enable them to survive basic 
attacks on the[ir] judicial independence.”14 Three months later, 
Justice Antonin Scalia sounded a more ominous message. Re-
sponding to Justice Stephen Breyer’s claim that “the treasure” 
of this country is that people who criticize the Court will still 
follow its rulings, Scalia suggested that the Supreme Court 
“has become a very political institution. And when that hap-
pens, the people in a democracy will try to seize control of it.”15 
 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/03/18/schiavo.brain-damaged. 
 10. An Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo. For ad-
ditional discussion, see infra notes 93–99 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra notes 32–35 and accompanying text. 
 12. See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of 
Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(h), 117 Stat. 650, 672 
(to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994(w)). Commenting on this legislation, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist complained that the “traditional interchange between the 
Congress and the Judiciary broke down when Congress enacted” this legisla-
tion “without any consideration of the views of the Judiciary.” CHIEF JUSTICE 
WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 2003 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
(2004), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2003yearendreport 
.html. 
 13. See F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, House Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, Zale Lecture in Public Policy at Stanford University 3 (May 9, 2005), 
http://judiciary.house.gov/media//pdfs/stanfordjudgesspeechpressversion505. 
pdf. 
 14. CHIEF JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 2004 YEAR-END REPORT ON 
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, 4, 8 (2005), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/ 
publicinfo/yearend/2004year-endreport.pdf. 
 15.  Constitutional Conversation with Justices Breyer, O’Connor and 
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But should the Supreme Court fear Congress? In the pages 
that follow, I will argue that the Court need not moderate its 
decision making in anticipation of a political backlash by to-
day’s Congress. To make this point, I will highlight differences 
between today’s Congress and the Congress that the Warren 
Court confronted in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In the late 
1950s, Southerners (who opposed school desegregation) and 
anti-Communist lawmakers formed a coalition in response to 
Supreme Court rulings. These lawmakers truly wanted to undo 
what the Court had done, and had very strong feelings about 
Congress’s power to independently interpret the Constitution.16 
Today, Congress is polarized along ideological lines. Party 
identification is especially important—with Democrats and Re-
publicans each seeking to send symbolic messages that rein-
force their status with both party leaders and their political 
base.17 Proposed jurisdiction-stripping measures are cut from 
this cloth. The purpose of these bills is to make a symbolic 
statement. That statement can be made whether or not these 
measures are enacted.18 
I will divide my comments into three parts. In Part I, I will 
look at the profound role that social and political forces play in 
shaping Supreme Court decision making. Part I will also ex-
plain why the Warren Court had good reason to take political 
backlash into account when pursuing its campaigns to desegre-
gate public schools and to protect the free speech rights of 
Communists. In so doing, I will comment on whether and when 
the Supreme Court should calibrate its decision making to 
avoid political reprisals from Congress. In Part II, I will turn 
my attention to today’s Congress. Initially, I will explain why 
today’s lawmakers are more interested in strengthening their 
base than in independently interpreting the Constitution. 
 
Scalia, Moderated by “Meet the Press” Host Tim Russert (C-SPAN 2 television 
broadcast Apr. 21, 2005), available at http://www.constitutioncenter.org (fol-
low “Program Archives” hyperlink; then follow “Constitutional Conversation 
with Supreme Court Justices” hyperlink; then follow “View the entire program 
via RealVideo from CSPAN” hyperlink). A portion of this broadcast is tran-
scribed in ‘The Abrams Report’ for April 22, MSNBC.COM, Apr. 25, 2005, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7629447/print/1/displamode/1098.  
 16. See infra notes 39–43 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra notes 62–76 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra notes 62–76 and accompanying text. I also make this point 
in a short essay examining why the Supreme Court was a low-salience issue in 
the 2004 presidential elections. See Neal Devins, Smoke, Not Fire, 65 MD. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2006). 
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Against this backdrop, I will discuss recent congressional ef-
forts to slap down state and federal judges by expanding or re-
stricting federal court jurisdiction. In Part III, I will discuss 
whether the Supreme Court should feel constrained in any way 
by Congress. Among other things, I will call attention to differ-
ences between federalism rulings (where the Court should not 
feel constrained) and rights-based rulings (where there is 
greater risk of a Court decision prompting a legislative back-
lash). 
I.  THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE19 
Supreme Court Justices cannot escape the social and po-
litical forces that engulf elected officials. Consider, for example, 
the appointments and confirmation process: “[b]ecause presi-
dents usually nominate Justices with philosophies similar to 
their own and the Senate generally confirms only nominees 
who have views consistent with the contemporary political 
mainstream, regular turnover results in a Court majority 
rarely holding significantly divergent political preferences from 
those held by the president and Congress.”20 Under this view, 
even Justices who vote their policy preferences will generally 
reach conclusions that are palatable to elected officials. 
Justices who do not have strong policy preferences, more-
over, often take into account elected official preferences, public 
opinion, elite opinion (newspapers, academics), and interest 
group filings.21 For these Justices, it does not matter that their 
votes sometimes back liberal interests and other times back 
conservative causes. What matters, instead, is reaching out-
comes that balance the needs of competing external interests 
(or at least those interests that these Justices think impor-
tant).22 
 
 19. The title of this part plays off of LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE 
CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998). The analysis which follows is generally con-
sistent with Epstein and Knight. 
 20. Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court as a Strategic National Policy-
maker, 50 EMORY L.J. 583, 586 (2001) (discussing Robert A. Dahl, Decision-
Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as National Policymaker, 6 J. 
PUB. L. 279 (1957)).  
 21. See generally LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES (1988) (de-
scribing the process by which constitutional law develops and the sources that 
influence that development); Michael J. Klarman, What’s So Great About Con-
stitutionalism?, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 145, 176–79 (1998) (discussing impact of 
elite opinion on Supreme Court decision making). 
 22. These Justices are also apt to use certiorari denials to steer away from 
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There is a third way that social and political forces shape 
Court decision making. Some Justices may seek to advance 
their preferred policy position by taking elected officials’ desires 
into account. These Justices are concerned about both the re-
fusal of elected officials to implement Court edicts and the 
prospects of elected officials negating or limiting an unpopular 
ruling by statute, constitutional amendment, or some other 
court-curbing action. Implementation concerns, for example, 
played a prominent role in the Watergate Tapes case, United 
States v. Nixon.23 Recognizing that the President might fail to 
comply with a fractured Court ruling, the Justices negotiated a 
compromise position on the question of executive privilege in 
order to secure a unanimous ruling.24 Likewise, in Brown v. 
Board of Education,25 the Court crafted a unanimous opinion 
that took into account likely Southern opposition to the deci-
sion.26 Specifically, rather than ask Southern school systems to 
desegregate, the Court both left it to local judges to take “var-
ied local school problems” into account and spoke of school au-
thorities as having “primary responsibility” for “assessing” and 
“solving” these problems.27 Correspondingly, the Court waited 
until 1968 to demand that desegregation plans promise “realis-
tically to work now.”28 At that time, Congress and the White 
House—through the 1964 Civil Rights Act and implementing 
regulations—made clear that the federal government backed 
school desegregation.29 
 
“no win” cases, that is, cases which place them in the middle of a political fire-
storm. For this very reason, the Rehnquist Court’s swing Justices—Sandra 
Day O’Connor and Anthony Kennedy—often used delaying strategies to avoid 
Court consideration of divisive social issues. See Neal Devins, Congress and 
the Making of the Second Rehnquist Court, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 773, 776 
(2003). 
 23. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
 24. BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 344–47 (1979). 
 25. 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
 26. For discussions of how the Justices bargained with each other and the 
importance of unanimity, see Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegre-
gation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948–1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1 
(1979); S. Sidney Ulmer, Earl Warren and the Brown Decision, 33 J. POL. 689 
(1971). 
 27. Brown, 349 U.S. at 299. 
 28. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968). 
 29. See NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 
154–58 (2004). For identical reasons, the Court steered clear of the antimisce-
genation issue until 1967 (when it invalidated state bans on interracial mar-
riage in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967)). Fearing a backlash that 
would jeopardize its school desegregation decision, the Court refused to hear a 
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That a Court which lacks the powers of the purse and 
sword would take implementation concerns into account is 
hardly surprising. Likewise, it is to be expected that some Jus-
tices take into account lawmaker efforts to punish the Court for 
politically unpopular decisions. Justices with weak policy pref-
erences do not want to precipitate an imbroglio with Congress; 
Justices with strong policy preferences want Congress to acqui-
esce to, not nullify, Court rulings.30 For this very reason, juris-
diction-stripping proposals sometimes alter judicial behavior.31 
Consider, for example, the Warren Court’s retreat from 
mid-1950s decisions providing civil liberties protections to 
 
1955 challenge to Virginia’s antimiscegenation statute. See EPSTEIN & 
KNIGHT, supra note 19, at 83; LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND 
AMERICAN POLITICS 71–73 (2000). 
 30. See generally EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 19 (discussing the stra-
tegic nature of Supreme Court decision making); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Re-
neging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 
79 CAL. L. REV. 613 (1991) (using game theory to describe Supreme Court in-
teraction with Congress and the President). For a critique of Epstein & Knight 
arguing both that the Court need not take congressional preferences into ac-
count and that the Justices rarely pay attention to lawmaker desires, see 
Frank B. Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48 DUKE L.J. 511, 527–31 (1998). See 
also Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of 
Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28, 31–33 (1997) (noting reasons 
why the Court cannot predict and probably should not fear retaliation from 
Congress).  
 31. See Roger Handberg & Harold F. Hill, Jr., Court Curbing, Court Re-
versals, and Judicial Review: The Supreme Court Versus Congress, 14 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 309, 320–21 (1980); Stuart S. Nagel, Court-Curbing Periods in 
American History, 18 VAND. L. REV. 925, 943 (1965); Gerald N. Rosenberg, Ju-
dicial Independence and the Reality of Political Power, 54 REV. POL. 369, 378–
83, 386–94 (1992). In addition to jurisdiction-stripping proposals, court-
curbing measures that limit judicial review include appropriations measures 
that prohibit Justice Department participation in lawsuits on specified topics 
and legislation dictating the type of relief a federal court can order when 
remedying a constitutional violation. See LOUIS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, PO-
LITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 44–45 (1992) (discussing congres-
sional efforts to limit court-ordered busing). For more recent examples, see 
Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme 
Court Decisionmaking, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1437, 1464–65 (2001). See also supra 
note 6 (discussing legislation limiting detainee access to federal courts). Fi-
nally, Congress may enact legislation that limits the reach of disfavored con-
stitutional rulings. See Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and 
Political Instability, 84 VA. L. REV. 83, 89 (1998) (listing examples). 
Congress may also nullify unpopular rulings without denying (or limiting) 
the federal courts’ role in our system of checks and balances. When Congress 
enacts legislation correcting a perceived judicial misinterpretation of a statute, 
Congress moots—but does not nullify—the Court’s previous decision. Like-
wise, Congress may seek to moot a constitutional ruling by sending a constitu-
tional amendment to the states for ratification. 
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Communists and other subversives. During its 1956–1957 
term, the Court decided twelve cases involving Communists, 
ruling against the government in every case.32 Congress re-
sponded with a vengeance, coming—as Chief Justice Warren 
put it— “dangerously close” to enacting legislation that would 
have stripped the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction in 
five domestic security areas.33 The Court relented, issuing deci-
sions that limited the scope of earlier rulings and otherwise 
permitting the government to prosecute subversive cases.34 As 
the New York Times editorialized in early 1960, “what Senator 
Jenner [the principal sponsor of court-stripping legislation] was 
unable to achieve [in Congress] the Supreme Court has now 
virtually accomplished on its own.”35 
The question remains: should the 1957 Warren Court have 
feared Congress? For the reasons that follow, I think that the 
answer to this question is a qualified “yes.” First, the Court 
could not take comfort in Congress’s longstanding tradition of 
defending judicial independence. FDR’s 1937 Court-packing 
proposal had almost been enacted.36 Twenty years later, the re-
ceived wisdom about Court-packing was that the Court had 
saved itself by executing an “astonishing about-face” in the 
spring of 1937, jettisoning the Lochner era by approving state 
and federal reform efforts in the midst of congressional consid-
eration of the Court-packing bill.37 Consequently, after Con-
gress came close to approving jurisdiction-stripping legislation 
in 1957, the Court could not assume that the war had been 
 
 32. For a summary of these decisions, see POWE, supra note 29, at 90–99. 
 33. EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 313 (1977). For a 
similar assessment, see POWE, supra note 29, at 132–33. For an illuminating 
discussion of why President Eisenhower might well have signed such a bill 
(notwithstanding the fact that his Justice Department testified against it), see 
WALTER F. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT 170–71 (1962). 
 34. See MURPHY, supra note 33, at 245–46; POWE, supra note 29, at 135–
56. The fact that most of the 1956 decisions were grounded in the Justices’ in-
terpretation of federal statutes, not the Constitution, allowed the Court to beat 
a hasty retreat without overruling itself. See Philip P. Frickey, Getting from 
Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process Theory, and 
Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 CAL. L. REV. 
397, 420–25 (2005). 
 35. MURPHY, supra note 33, at 245 (quoting Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 
1960, at 36:1). 
 36. See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN 148–
52 (1995). 
 37. See id. at 154–56. For a competing account suggesting that the 1937 
“switch” had nothing to do with Court-packing, see generally BARRY CUSH-
MAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT (1998). 
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won.38 Second, Court decision making was truly upsetting to 
significant factions within Congress. Fears about Communism 
and its threat to domestic security resonated with both law-
makers and the American people. Even though the crisis at-
mosphere of the early 1950s had eased, Congress continued to 
beat the anti-Communist drum.39 More than that, Southern 
lawmakers strongly disapproved of Brown and, with it, the 
Court. One hundred one of the 128 Southerners in Congress 
signed a Manifesto “pledg[ing] to use all lawful means to bring 
about a reversal of” the decision.40 With Southern lawmakers 
joining forces with anti-Communist lawmakers, the Court un-
derstood that it could ill afford to agitate this potent coalition.41 
Third (and relatedly), a substantial number of lawmakers in 
the late 1950s thought that courts should give great weight to 
congressional interpretations of the Constitution. These law-
makers embraced an “independent constitutionalist” perspec-
tive, emphasizing the distinctive constitutional responsibilities 
of the legislature and pointing to drawbacks associated with 
leaving interpretation strictly to judges.42 In particular, forty 
percent of lawmakers thought that courts should give “control-
 
 38. Indeed, Congress did narrow a 1957 ruling (Jencks v. United States, 
353 U.S. 657, 672 (1957) (allowing an alleged Communist to have access to all 
government documents touching the events and activities at issue in his trial)) 
by specifying that a criminal defendant can only gain access to documents in-
volving his own statements or the statements of a witness called by the gov-
ernment to testify. Act of Sept. 2, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-269, 71 Stat. 595 (codi-
fied as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2000)). And while this may have only 
been a “watered-down measure to modify slightly one evidentiary rule used in 
criminal trials,” Barry Friedman, “Things Forgotten” in the Debate over Judi-
cial Independence, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 737, 752 (1998), Congress nonetheless 
used this bill to signal its willingness to enact correcting legislation. 
 39. See DONALD G. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 246–91 
(1966). 
 40. 102 CONG. REC. 4515–16 (1956). The “true meaning” of this Manifesto, 
as Anthony Lewis observed, “was to make defiance of the Supreme Court . . . 
socially acceptable in the South.” ANTHONY LEWIS, PORTRAIT OF A DECADE 45 
(1964). Correspondingly, a 1957 poll about public attitudes towards the Su-
preme Court revealed that twenty percent of Americans had changed their at-
titude in recent years, with three-quarters of those saying that they now had 
an unfavorable view of the Court. MURPHY, supra note 33, at 264 (discussing a 
Gallup Poll about the Court). Of those who changed their mind, six out of 
every seven Southerners reported that their opinion of the Court had changed 
for the worse. Id. at 265. 
 41. See MORGAN, supra note 39, at 270; POWE, supra note 29, at 134. 
 42. See Bruce G. Peabody, Congressional Attitudes Towards Constitu-
tional Interpretation, in CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 39, 44 (Neal 
Devins & Keith E. Whittington eds., 2005). 
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ling weight” to congressional interpretations of the Constitu-
tion.43 For these lawmakers, Congress had reason to assert it-
self in the face of Court decisions undermining lawmaker in-
terpretations of the Constitution. 
That Congress was poised to act, of course, does not mean 
that Congress would have acted. After all, Congress did not en-
act jurisdiction-stripping legislation in 1957. Congress, more-
over, had signaled its support for an independent Court 
through word and deeds. FDR’s Court-packing plan was ulti-
mately rebuked, and an “uninterrupted expansion of federal 
court jurisdiction . . . revealed a high degree of congressional 
respect for and reliance on the federal courts that a few un-
popular decisions simply could not erode.”44 More than that, 
there are numerous veto points in the legislative process. In 
addition to a possible presidential veto, proposed legislation 
must clear committees and gain approval by both the House 
and Senate.45 Procedural obstacles placed by committee lead-
ers, party leaders or members can also result in the tabling of 
proposed legislation.46 
On balance, however, the Court’s moderates—Felix Frank-
furter and John Marshall Harlan—had good reason to reverse 
course. By approving government regulation of subversives, the 
Court “helped sap the vigor of the Court attacks” and “provided 
a ready means by which the Court foes could execute a face-
saving retreat of their own.”47 Assuming that Frankfurter and 
Harlan were ambivalent about the Court’s Communist rulings, 
the benefits of this retreat certainly outweighed the risks of ju-
risdiction-stripping legislation and, more generally, strained re-
lations with Congress. But even if Frankfurter and Harlan 
firmly backed the initial rulings, the retreat may still have 
made sense. As Walter Murphy concluded in his study of this 
 
 43. Id. at 48 (extrapolating survey data found in MORGAN, supra note 39, 
at 365–83). Not surprisingly, Southern lawmakers disproportionately em-
braced this “independent constitutionalist” perspective. See id. at 45. 
 44. Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability and 
the Role of Constitutional Norms in Congressional Regulation of the Courts, 78 
IND. L.J. 153, 209 (2003); see also Barry Friedman, The History of the Coun-
termajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law’s Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971, 
1028–46 (2000) (highlighting public support for the Court during the Court-
packing periods). 
 45. See Segal, supra note 30, at 31–32. 
 46. This is what ultimately happened to the 1957 proposal. See POWE, su-
pra note 29, at 131–33. 
 47. MURPHY, supra note 33, at 238. 
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episode: “The retreat of the Warren Court was a tactical with-
drawal, not a rout.”48 No constitutional rulings were over-
turned, and the Court held firm to its rejection of Jim Crow. 
Over the next few years, moreover, turnover in Congress and 
the White House facilitated a string of Court rulings that pro-
vided expanded civil liberties protections to Communists and 
other critics of the government.49 
The sensibility of the Warren Court calibrating its decision 
making in the face of a hostile Congress does not mean that the 
Supreme Court ipso facto should moderate its decision making 
when faced with criticism by Congress or other elected officials. 
Unlike the Warren Court, for example, the Burger Court had 
no reason to fear the enactment of Carter- and Reagan-era pro-
posals to strip the courts of jurisdiction over abortion, school 
busing, and school prayer.50 Not only did the Democratically-
controlled House refuse to act on these proposals, the Reagan 
administration did not back Court-stripping proposals.51 
The Burger Court experience is revealing for another rea-
son. Even though the Court did not retool its doctrine on abor-
tion, school prayer, and busing, it did not block Congress from 
expressing disagreement with these decisions. Congress, for 
example, was able to use its appropriations powers to signal its 
disapproval of abortion rights and busing remedies.52 Through 
the Equal Access Act (mandating that public schools allow reli-
gious organizations equal access to school facilities), moreover, 
Congress was able to facilitate religious expression in public 
 
 48. Id. at 246. 
 49. See Frickey, supra note 34, at 426–39; see also Neal Devins, Commen-
tary to Philip P. Frickey & Gordon Silverstein, Congress and the Earl Warren 
Court, BULL. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI., Summer 2004, at 6, 15 (suggesting that 
the Court acted opportunistically in returning to the Communist issue at a 
time when it knew that Congress would not resist its decision making). 
 50. See EDWARD KEYNES WITH RANDALL K. MILLER, THE COURT VS. CON-
GRESS: PRAYER, BUSING, AND ABORTION 200–03, 217–44, 291–98 (1989). 
 51. See id. Notwithstanding its attacks on the Court for its lawless, activ-
ist decision making, administration officials contended that several of these 
proposals were unconstitutional and/or bad public policy. See Nomination of 
Edwin Meese III: Hearings on the President’s Nomination of Edwin Meese III 
to be Attorney General of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 98th Cong. 185–97 (1984) (statements of Attorney General nominee 
Meese and outgoing Attorney General Smith that Court-stripping proposals 
are often unwise and constitutionally impermissible). 
 52. See DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 29, at 132–34 (abortion); id. at 159–
61 (busing). 
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schools.53 By providing elected officials with an opportunity to 
register their policy preferences, the Court helped avoid a head-
on confrontation with Congress and the White House.54 
The lesson here is simple: the Supreme Court can pursue 
its favored policies so long as Congress can pursue its favored 
policies. Congress’s rejection of Court-packing in the 1930s and 
its failure to enact jurisdiction-stripping legislation in the 
1950s or 1980s suggests that lawmakers are reluctant to chal-
lenge the premises of an independent judiciary.55 Nevertheless, 
if Court decision making cuts at the core of lawmaker prefer-
ences, Congress may act and may act boldly. For that reason, 
the Court had good reason to retreat from both the Lochner era 
and from 1957 rulings protecting the civil liberty interests of 
Communists. The Burger era, in contrast, was a time in which 
Congress was divided over the soundness of Court rulings on 
abortion, school busing, and school prayer. A majority of mem-
bers were willing to express disapproval through appropriation 
bans and other indirect challenges. A majority, however, could 
not coalesce around a more fundamental challenge to the 
Court’s decision making. Consequently, the Burger Court made 
few concessions to Congress.56 
What then of the Roberts Court? Should it see recent at-
tacks on judicial independence as a harbinger of things to 
come? In the next part of this Essay, I will argue that recent ju-
risdiction-stripping proposals are little more than rhetorical 
ploys. Indeed, Congress-Court relations during the past decade 
signal congressional disinterest in the Constitution and the 
Supreme Court.57 For these and other reasons, the Roberts 
Court should not fear Congress. 
 
 
 53. Id. at 203–04. 
 54. For an illuminating treatment of how it is that judicial review does 
not impinge on important congressional interests—so long as there are outlets 
for Congress to advance its favored policies—see generally J. MITCHELL PICK-
ERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION IN CONGRESS (2004). For a review of 
this book that emphasizes this phenomenon, see Keith E. Whittington, James 
Madison Has Left the Building, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137 (2005) (book review). 
For additional discussion, see infra notes 125–30 and accompanying text. 
 55. See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text. 
 56. In fact, there is no reason to think that the Justices were not voting 
their sincere policy preferences when upholding congressional spending pre-
rogatives (Burger Court) or equal access legislation (Rehnquist Court). 
 57. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text. 
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II.  MAKING SENSE OF ONGOING LAWMAKER 
CHALLENGES TO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
The current round of congressional attacks against the 
courts is much more a reflection of fundamental changes in 
Congress than it is about lawmaker disappointment with Su-
preme Court decision making. Unlike attacks against the War-
ren or Burger Courts, the Rehnquist Court did not issue deci-
sions that were terribly upsetting to lawmakers.58 If anything, 
Congress has not used jurisdiction-stripping measures to ex-
press its disapproval with the results of Rehnquist Court deci-
sion making. Only proposed legislation on habeas petitions filed 
by Guantánamo Bay detainees sought to nullify a Rehnquist 
Court decision.59 But lawmakers rejected an outright ban on 
federal court jurisdiction, preferring legislation that allowed 
D.C. Circuit Court review of military tribunal judgments.60 The 
only other court-stripping bill responsive to Supreme Court de-
cision making did not target the outcome of any particular deci-
sion. Instead, lawmakers sought to forbid federal courts from 
considering foreign law.61 
 
 58. See Neal Devins, Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred on the 
Court’s Anti-Congress Crusade, 51 DUKE L.J. 435, 448–54 (2001). 
 59. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, S. 1042, 
109th Cong. § 1092(d) (as passed by Senate, Nov. 15, 2005). The bill was spon-
sored by Senator Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) and took direct aim at the Supreme 
Court’s recognition of detainee rights in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
According to Graham, detainees were enemy combatants and, as such, should 
not have meaningful access to civilian courts. Press Release, Senator Lindsey 
Graham, Senate Passes Graham Detainee Plan (Nov. 10, 2005), http://lgraham 
.senate.gov/index.cfm?mode=presspage&id=248690; see also Schmitt, supra 
note 5. 
 60. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 
109-163, § 1405, 119 Stat. 3136, 3476–79 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801); see 
Jonathan Weisman, Senators Agree on Detainee Rights, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 
2005, at A1. By limiting federal judicial review of military commission verdicts 
to the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court may be without power to review de-
tainee appeals. That issue may be decided by the Supreme Court in Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld, No. 05-184, a lawsuit challenging the legality of U.S. military 
commissions at Guantánamo. See Charles Lane, Court Case Challenges Power 
of President, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2006, at A1. For additional discussion, see 
infra text accompanying notes 116–17. See also Charles Lane, Case Tests 
Power of Judiciary, President, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2006, at A6 (noting that 
Solicitor General Clement's efforts to argue that the Court was without au-
thority to decide Hamdan “immediately landed him in trouble with several 
justices, who found the terms of the [Detainee Treatment Act] . . . too vague to 
warrant cutting back what they regard as a vital judicial check on unlawful 
executive detentions”). 
 61. American Justice for American Citizens Act, H.R. 1658, 109th Cong. 
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Rather than focus on the Supreme Court, lawmakers tar-
geted any judicial ruling that was upsetting to its constituents. 
Some of these rulings come from state courts (the Massachu-
setts Supreme Court’s gay marriage decision62 and decisions of 
the Florida courts in the Terri Schiavo case);63 others come 
from lower federal courts (the Ninth Circuit’s invalidation of 
the Pledge of Allegiance64 and a district court order requiring 
Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore to remove the Ten Com-
mandments from the state Supreme Court rotunda).65 It does 
not matter that some of these rulings involve issues that are 
not subject to federal court review (the Massachusetts gay mar-
riage decision)66 and others are about issues that the Supreme 
Court has signaled its likely agreement with Congress (the 
Pledge of Allegiance).67 Proponents of these measures want to 
send a message: Congress will advance its policymaking 
agenda by striking back at the courts. This message, however, 
is a symbolic one. More significantly, this message is not di-
rected at the courts; it is directed at interest groups and vot-
ers.68 
Dramatic differences between today’s Congress and the 
Warren- and Burger-era Congresses explain why lawmakers 
have incentive to launch rhetorical attacks against the courts 
through jurisdiction-stripping and related proposals. The defin-
 
(2005). 
 62. Goodridge v. Mass. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 63. The Schiavo litigation stretched on for years, with perhaps the most 
important decision coming in September of 2004 when the Florida Supreme 
Court struck down a law that gave Governor Bush the power to reinsert 
Schiavo’s feeding tube. Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 324 (Fla. 2004). 
 64. Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 65. Glassroth v. Moore, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1349 (M.D. Ala. 2003). 
 66. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941. 
 67. In Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004), no 
Justice concluded that the Pledge was unconstitutional. Five Justices con-
cluded that the plaintiff was without standing to challenge the Pledge, id. at 
17–18; three Justices (Rehnquist, C.J., O’Connor & Thomas, JJ.) filed concur-
ring opinions defending the constitutionality of the Pledge, id. at 31, 33, 46; 
and one Justice (Scalia, J.) recused himself from the case after making specific 
remarks on it prior to its being appealed to the Court. See Linda Greenhouse, 
Supreme Court to Consider Case on ‘Under God’ in Pledge to Flag, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 15, 2003, at A1. Justice Scalia specifically mentioned the Ninth Circuit 
decision “as an example of how courts were misinterpreting the Constitution 
to ‘exclude God from the public forums and from political life.’” Id. 
 68. See Neal Devins, Tom DeLay: Popular Constitutionalist?, 81 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (suggesting that interest group pressure ex-
plains Congress’s intervention in the Terri Schiavo case). 
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ing feature of today’s Congress is political polarization along 
ideological lines.69 Liberal “Rockefeller Republicans” and con-
servative “Southern Democrats” no longer ensure ideological 
diversity within the parties. In the South, conservative Democ-
rats were replaced with Southern Republicans—so that the re-
maining Southern Democrats are far more liberal.70 Corre-
spondingly, moderate-to-liberal Republicans were replaced by 
“Ronald Reagan’s GOP.” A 2004–2005 study, for example, 
documented that (with one exception) every Republican mem-
ber of the House and Senate is more conservative than their 
Democratic counterpart.71 
This ideological divide now seems a permanent feature of 
Congress.72 Outside of presidential elections, Democrats and 
Republicans have little reason to appeal to median voters. With 
only one-half of eligible voters actually voting, candidates and 
party leaders increasingly look to the party’s partisan base for 
support.73 Equally significant, there no longer are competitive 
races in the House of Representatives. District lines are drawn 
in ways that guarantee certain seats to Democrats and other 
seats to Republicans.74 As a result, the party primary controls  
 
 
 
 69. My discussion of political polarization in Congress is drawn from Neal 
Devins, The Academic Expert Before Congress: Observations and Lessons from 
Bill Van Alstyne’s Testimony, 54 DUKE L.J. 1525, 1526–27, 1534–45 (2005). 
 70. See Jason M. Roberts & Steven S. Smith, Procedural Contexts, Party 
Strategy, and Conditional Party Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 
1971–2000, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 305, 306 (2003). 
 71. The one exception was former Senator Zell Miller, a Democrat from 
Georgia who was more conservative than a handful of Republican Senators. 
See 108th House Ranking Order (Aug. 23, 2005), http://voteview.com/ 
hou108.htm; 108th Senate Rank Ordering (Oct. 24, 2004), http://voteview.com/ 
sen108.htm.  
 72. See Sean M. Theriault, The Case of the Vanishing Moderates: Party 
Polarization in the Modern Congress 5–6 (May 2, 2004) (unpublished manu-
script), http://www.la.utexas.edu/~seant/vanishing.pdf (noting that party po-
larization is “one of the most obvious and recognizable trends” in the modern 
Congress and that the “overwhelming evidence” is that party members in-
creasingly return to their “ideological homes”). 
 73. David S. Broder, Editorial, An Old-Fashioned Win, WASH. POST, Nov. 
4, 2004, at A25. For this very reason, President Bush targeted religious con-
servatives in his 2004 reelection campaign. Laurie Goodstein & William Yard-
ley, President Benefits from Efforts to Build a Coalition of Religious Voters, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2004, at A22; Dana Milbank, For the President, a Vote of 
Full Faith and Credit, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2004, at A7. 
 74. See Samuel Issacharoff, Collateral Damage: The Endangered Center in 
American Politics, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 415, 427–28 (2004). 
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who will win the election and, consequently, candidates focus 
their energies on the partisans who vote in these primaries.75 
Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that Democratic 
and Republican lawmakers increasingly see themselves as 
members of a party, not as independent power brokers. Corre-
spondingly, Democrats and Republicans look to party leaders to 
formulate a message that will resonate with their increasingly 
partisan base.76 Constitutional values certainly figure into this 
message: Democrats emphasize that they are the party of civil 
rights and individual liberties. During the Roberts and Alito 
confirmation hearings, for example, Democratic Senators spoke 
at length about abortion, voting rights, the use of torture in 
fighting the War on Terror, and federalism-based limits on 
Congress’s power to enact antidiscrimination legislation.77 Re-
publicans, especially House Republicans, send a message that 
resonates with social conservatives. Republican-led efforts to 
countermand state and federal court decisions on same-sex 
marriage, the sanctity of life, the Pledge of Allegiance, and the 
Ten Commandments exemplify this practice.78 
The consequences of this shift to “message politics” are pro-
found. First, lawmakers are less interested in what happens to 
legislation after it is enacted—including a court decision strik-
ing down legislation.79 As compared to earlier Congresses (in-
cluding the Warren-era Congress), “[t]he electoral requirement 
[for today’s lawmaker] is not that he make pleasing things 
 
 75. See id.; Jeffrey Rosen, Center Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2005, § 6 
(Magazine), at 17. Furthermore, with more than half of all Senators having 
first served in the House, the partisan battle lines that characterize the House 
are increasingly spilling over to the Senate. See Rosen, supra. 
 76. See generally C. Lawrence Evans, Committees, Leaders, and Message 
Politics, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 217, 219–21 (Lawrence C. Dodd & 
Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 7th ed. 2001) (discussing the emergence of mes-
sage politics). 
 77. See Adam Nagourney, Partisan Tenor of Alito Hearing Reflects a 
Quick Change in Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2006, at A17; Robin Toner 
& David D. Kirkpatrick, Liberals and Conservatives Remain Worlds Apart on 
Roberts’s Suitability, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2005, at A22. For similar reasons, 
Democrats had earlier accused the Rehnquist Court of engaging in “conserva-
tive judicial activism.” Neal Devins, The Federalism-Rights Nexus: Explaining 
Why Senate Democrats Can Tolerate Rehnquist Court Decision Making but Not 
the Rehnquist Court, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1307, 1308 & n.3 (2002). 
 78. See supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text; infra notes 93–100 and 
accompanying text. 
 79. See Keith E. Whittington, Taking What They Give Us: Explaining the 
Court’s Federalism Offensive, 51 DUKE L.J. 477, 512–15 (2001). 
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happen but that he make pleasing judgmental statements.”80 
Indeed, a Supreme Court ruling invalidating a federal statute 
provides lawmakers with an opportunity to score political 
points by denouncing the Court.81 
Second, today’s lawmakers do not place a high value on 
their power to independently interpret the Constitution. Con-
sider, for example, congressional committee evaluation of con-
stitutional questions. Over the past thirty years, the percent of 
hearings raising significant constitutional issues has declined 
throughout Congress.82 One explanation for this phenomenon is 
the growing ideological polarization in Congress.83 As compared 
to the Warren and Burger Court eras (where regional divides 
and ideological diversity cut back the power of party leaders), 
today’s lawmakers are committed to their party’s policy 
agenda. The question of whether the Supreme Court will find 
that agenda constitutional matters less to today’s lawmakers.84 
Consider, for example, the Rehnquist Court’s federalism re-
vival. Even though the Court invalidated all or part of twenty-
three statutes from 1995 to 2000, Congress held as many hear-
ings about federalism in the 1970s as it did in the 1990s.85 
More than that, the hearings that it did hold in the 1990s did 
not focus on the Court; instead, they were mainly concerned 
with the federalism implications of the 1994 Republican take-
over of Congress.86 
 
 80. DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 62 (2d 
ed. 2004). 
 81. For an excellent treatment of this topic (looking at Rehnquist Court 
federalism rulings), see Whittington, supra note 79, at 512–18. Lawmakers 
can also score political points by denouncing a state court ruling. Legislation 
mandating federal court review of the Terri Schiavo case and proposed legisla-
tion banning federal court consideration of same-sex marriage are examples of 
this phenomenon. 
 82. See Keith E. Whittington et al., The Constitution and Congressional 
Committees: 1971–2000, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEG-
ISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE (Richard Bauman & Tsvi Kahana 
eds., forthcoming July 2006). Of those committees that regularly considered 
constitutional questions (education, labor, foreign affairs, judiciary), the only 
ones that continue to hold the same number of constitutional hearings are the 
Judiciary Committees. See id. 
 83. For a more detailed treatment, see id. 
 84. See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text. 
 85. See Whittington et al., supra note 82. 
 86. See id. For a more detailed treatment of 1990s hearings, see Keith E. 
Whittington, Hearing About the Constitution in Congressional Committees, in 
CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 42, at 87, 95–105. See also 
Barry Friedman & Anna L. Harvey, Electing the Supreme Court, 78 IND. L.J. 
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When today’s Congress considers constitutional questions, 
moreover, lawmakers steer clear of nonpartisan witnesses, pre-
ferring instead to hear from witnesses that will back up the 
preexisting views of the party that selects that witness.87 An 
increasingly ideological, increasingly polarized Congress sees 
hearings as staged events in which each side can call witnesses 
who will explain their views to the public.88 In sharp contrast, 
committee hearings during the Warren and Burger Court eras 
reflected ideological diversity within the Democratic and Re-
publican parties. Most notably, several Senate committees 
made use of unified staffs and generally operated in a biparti-
san way—so that hearings considering constitutional questions 
often featured nonpartisan academic experts.89 
Another measure of how today’s Congress differs from the 
earlier Congresses is lawmaker attitudes towards congressional 
interpretation of the Constitution. In 1959 (when lawmakers 
cared intensely about Warren Court decisions on school deseg-
regation and subversives) forty percent of lawmakers thought 
that courts should give controlling weight to congressional in-
terpretations of the Constitution; in 1999–2000 (during the 
height of the Rehnquist Court federalism revival), only 13.8 
percent of lawmakers thought that the courts should give con-
trolling weight to congressional interpretations of the Constitu-
tion.90 Correspondingly, seventy-one percent of today’s law-
makers adhere to a “joint constitutionalist” perspective 
whereby courts should give either “limited” or “no weight” to 
congressional assessments of the constitutionality of legisla-
tion.91 
 
 
123, 125 (2003) (arguing that lawmakers agreed with Rehnquist Court federal-
ism decisions and, for that reason, did not seek to countermand the Court for 
invalidating federal statutes).  
 87. See Devins, supra note 69, at 1542–44. 
 88. See ROGER H. DAVIDSON & WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESS AND ITS 
MEMBERS 217 (10th ed. 2006) (“Hearings are often orchestrated as a form of 
political theater . . . .”). Furthermore, because there is rarely an academic con-
sensus on the constitutional questions that divide Democrats and Republicans, 
committee staffers can always find a sincere, well-qualified constitutional law 
expert willing to back their position. 
 89. See Devins, supra note 69, at 1543 (making this point by comparing 
today’s congressional practices with those in the 1970s). 
 90. Bruce G. Peabody, Congressional Constitutional Interpretation and the 
Courts: A Preliminary Inquiry into Legislative Attitudes, 1959–2001, 29 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 127, 147 (2004). 
 91. Id. 
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Third, lawmakers have incentive to launch rhetorical at-
tacks against the courts. As noted above, today’s Congress is 
both more accepting of Supreme Court decisions invalidating 
federal statutes and less constrained by its responsibility to in-
dependently interpret the Constitution. By placing significant 
emphasis on the message they deliver to their base, lawmakers 
see court rulings as opportunities to make judgmental state-
ments that resonate with their party and their constituents 
(voters and interest groups).92 Consider, for example, legisla-
tion expanding federal court jurisdiction in the Terri Schiavo 
case.93 The National Right to Life Committee drafted the origi-
nal bill.94 More significantly, then-House majority leader Tom 
DeLay and Senate majority leader Bill Frist both pushed for 
legislation in order to strengthen their ties to Christian conser-
vatives.95 Frist spoke of the bill as “affirm[ing] our nation’s 
commitment to preserving the sanctity of life”96 to shore up 
support from right-to-life interests in his burgeoning 2008 run 
for the presidency. DeLay used the Schiavo issue to rally social 
conservatives behind him in the face of charges and attacks 
over alleged ethics violations.97 In a speech to the Family Re-
search Council, DeLay linked the negative response to the 
Schiavo legislation from media elites to coordinated attacks on 
American conservatism and his own ethics battles.98 For De-
Lay: “[t]hat whole syndicate that they have going on right now  
 
 
 
 92. See Whittington, supra note 79, at 513. 
 93. An Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. 
No. 109-3, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. (119 Stat.) 15. 
 94. See Lynn Vincent, The Fight of Her Life, WORLD MAG., Mar. 19, 2005, 
http://www.worldmag.com/articles/10431. 
 95. See David Kirkpatrick & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, How Family’s Cause 
Reached the Halls of Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2005, at A1; Shailagh 
Murray & Mike Allen, Schiavo Case Tests Priorities of GOP, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 26, 2005, at A1; The Doctor’s New Right Wing, ECONOMIST, Apr. 30, 
2005, at 32. For similar reasons, Frist spoke at “Justice Sunday,” a nationally-
televised Family Research Council event depicting Democratic opposition to 
George W. Bush judicial nominations as “tyranny to people of faith.” Frist 
Speaks to Christian Anti-Filibuster Rally, CNN.COM, Apr. 25, 2005, 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/04/24/justice.sunday/. 
 96. Press Release, Office of Senator Bill Frist, Frist Comments on Schiavo 
Bill Enrollment (Mar. 21, 2005), http://frist.senate.gov/index.cfm?Fuse 
Action=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease_id=1886&Month=3&Year=2005. 
 97. See Carl Hulse & Adam Nagourney, Briefly Back in the Spotlight, De-
Lay Now Steps Aside, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2005, at A9. 
 98. See id. 
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is for one purpose and one purpose only, and that is to destroy 
the conservative movement.”99 
Recent court-stripping proposals are cut from the same 
cloth. The Constitution Restoration Act of 2004, for example, 
sought to strengthen ties between the GOP and religious con-
servatives by denying federal courts the power to review a gov-
ernment official’s “acknowledgment of God as the sovereign 
source of law, liberty, or government.”100 The bill responded to 
a longstanding grievance between the religious right and the 
courts, namely, that “since the famous prayer in school cases 
[in 1963], our Federal courts have showed increased hostility 
toward the acknowledgment of God in the public square.”101 
More immediately, the bill expressed disapproval of a federal 
court decision ordering Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore to 
remove a granite monument of the Ten Commandments from 
the state Supreme Court rotunda.102 The fact that Moore had 
been removed from office for failing to comply with this federal 
court ruling did not deter bill sponsors; if anything, Moore’s 
willingness to stand on conviction encouraged sponsors to 
strengthen their ties to religious conservatives by celebrating 
Moore’s faith-based campaign against the courts.103 
 
 
 
 99. Id. In May 2005, conservative leaders threw a banquet in honor of 
DeLay; at that banquet, DeLay was presented with a petition signed by con-
servative leaders “decry[ing]” attacks on DeLay and calling on Congress to 
protect the country “from tyrannical judges who currently operate free of any 
restraints.” Sam Rosenfeld, Disorder in the Court, AM. PROSPECT, Jul. 2005, 
http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewPrint& 
articleId=9867. 
 100. Constitution Restoration Act of 2004, H.R. 3799, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 101. 150 CONG. REC. H7079 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2004) (statement of Rep. 
Pence). 
 102. See Rosenfeld, supra note 99. 
 103. Indeed, Moore testified at both Senate and House hearings on the 
Constitution Restoration Act—hearings intended to publicize the federal 
courts’ hostility towards religion. See Beyond the Pledge of Allegiance: Hostility 
to Religious Expression in the Public Square Before the Subcomm. on the Con-
stitution, Civil Rights, and Property Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
108th Cong. 24–27 (2004) (statement of Roy S. Moore, Former C.J., Supreme 
Court of Alabama); Constitution Restoration Act of 2004: Hearing on H.R. 3799 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 74–98 (2004) (statement of Roy S. 
Moore, Foundation for Moral Law, Inc.); see also Rosenfeld, supra note 99 (ar-
guing that the Moore hearings provided “another opportunity to stoke and sus-
tain the outrage of the Christian right”). 
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Republicans have also used jurisdiction-stripping proposals 
on same-sex marriage,104 the Pledge of Allegiance,105 and judi-
cial invocations of international law106 to reaffirm their com-
mitment to the social conservative agenda. In so doing, Repub-
lican leaders hope that religious and other social conservatives 
will back the GOP in congressional and presidential elections. 
For example, the House debated and voted on the Pledge and 
same-sex marriage bills immediately before the 2004 elec-
tions.107 At that time, Republican strategists thought that 
President Bush’s reelection might hinge on the willingness of 
religious conservatives to vote in the 2004 elections.108 More 
generally, Republican leaders sought to detract attention from 
the war in Iraq by turning the 2004 election into a referendum 
on moral values.109 
In pursuing these objectives, it does not matter whether ju-
risdiction-stripping proposals are enacted (let alone found con-
stitutional). Indeed, since Americans have historically sup-
ported judicial independence,110 Republican leaders have little 
to gain by pushing for the enactment of these bills. Perhaps for 
this reason, two of the 2003–2004 jurisdiction-stripping bills 
never made it out of committee (official acknowledgments of 
God, invocations of international law); the other two were ap-
proved, but the vote was so late in the 2004 session that the 
bills were never considered in the Senate (same-sex marriage, 
the Pledge of Allegiance).111 
In 2005, House Republicans reintroduced these meas-
ures.112 Unlike the Warren-era, there is little reason for the 
 
 104. Marriage Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 1100, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 105. Pledge Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 2028, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 106. American Justice for American Citizens Act, H.R. 1658, 109th Cong. 
(2005). 
 107. H.R. Res. 781, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R.J. Res. 106, 108th Cong. 
(2004). 
 108. Peter Wallsten, Conflicted Evangelicals Could Cost Bush Votes, L.A. 
TIMES, Oct. 27, 2004, at A1. 
 109. See Milbank, supra note 73 (noting that while moral values ranked 
below security and economic issues as an explanation for the vote, the election 
was “unique in the assertiveness of evangelicals and the overt appeals made 
by the candidates to the faithful”). 
 110. See infra notes 120–21 and accompanying text; see also CHARLES 
GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS AND CONGRESS COLLIDE 1–21 (forthcoming 
2006). 
 111. For a detailed discussion of the timing of the votes, see Devins, supra 
note 18 . 
 112. House Republicans, on December 16, 2005, also introduced the Safe-
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Roberts Court to see these bills as a threat to their independ-
ence. For reasons detailed above, Congress has incentive to 
launch rhetorical attacks against the courts in order to score 
points with its partisan base.113 Correspondingly, rather than 
reflect heartfelt disappointment with decisions of the U.S. Su-
preme Court, the principal targets of recent congressional at-
tacks against the courts have been state and lower federal 
courts.114 Indeed, the Supreme Court could have mollified law-
maker concerns by, for example, upholding the Pledge or state 
bans on same-sex marriage. Supporters of these measures, 
however, had no interest in waiting for the Supreme Court to 
speak. Their concern was with staking out a position on these 
issues. A state court or lower federal court ruling provided 
them with that opportunity and they seized it.115 
Even when today’s lawmakers are truly concerned about 
the ramifications of Supreme Court decision making, Congress 
remains reluctant to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction. The 
2005 legislation limiting detainee access to federal courts is the 
exception which proves this rule. Rather than approve sweep-
ing legislation that sought to nullify Rasul v. Bush, Congress 
approved a compromise bill that sought to preserve meaningful 
judicial review of the military’s handling of detainees at 
Guantánamo Bay.116 By authorizing D.C. Circuit Court review 
of military tribunal decisions, Congress simultaneously ad-
 
guarding Our Religious Liberties Act, H.R. 4576, 109th Cong. (2005). This leg-
islation would strip federal courts of jurisdiction over the Ten Command-
ments, the Pledge, and the National Motto. Id. 
 113. This is especially true of the House. With computer-driven redistrict-
ing guaranteeing some House seats to Republicans and others to Democrats, 
House members need only appeal to party partisans who vote in primaries. 
See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. Senators, in contrast, run in 
state-wide elections and must exercise caution before embracing proposals 
that can alienate median voters. Perhaps for this reason, House votes on 
court-stripping bills were taken too late in the legislative cycle for the Senate 
to feel any pressure to consider these bills. See supra note 111 and accompany-
ing text. But see supra note 75 (noting that a majority of Senators first served 
in the House and, consequently, the Senate has become more and more like 
the House). 
 114. See supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text. 
 115. One other reason that recent jurisdiction-stripping proposals are rhe-
torical is that the George W. Bush administration has not been asked to stake 
out a public position on these bills. During the Warren and Burger Court eras 
(when court-stripping proponents were truly upset with Supreme Court deci-
sion making), the Eisenhower and Reagan administrations were asked to tes-
tify before Congress. See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 31, at 40–44. 
 116. See supra note 6. 
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vanced the needs of the military (by eliminating often frivolous 
habeas filings in federal district court) and an independent ju-
diciary (by upholding the core principle of Rasul v. Bush, 
namely, the need for independent judicial review of military de-
cision making).117 
In saying that the Roberts Court should not feel threatened 
by recent congressional attacks on judicial independence, I do 
not mean to suggest that the Court has carte blanche to rule as 
it likes on any issue before it. For reasons I will detail in the fi-
nal part of this Essay, the Roberts Court has substantial, but 
not unlimited, authority to advance its favored policies and doc-
trines. 
III.  THE FUTURE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
Unlike the Warren era (where a potent coalition of law-
makers was truly upset with Court decision making), today’s 
Congress is not at all disappointed with Rehnquist Court deci-
sion making. Its anticourt rhetoric, for reasons detailed in Part 
II, is tied to lawmaker incentives to strengthen ties with their 
political base.118 Unless and until the goals of social conserva-
tives are also acceptable to majorities in both houses of Con-
gress and the White House, the current wave of attacks against 
the judiciary should be seen as symbolic politics. 
Indeed, even if the social conservative agenda becomes the 
dominant agenda in Congress and the White House, there is 
good reason to think that elected officials would steer away 
from jurisdiction-stripping measures.119 First, median voters 
 
 117. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text. It is also noteworthy 
that the compromise legislation was explicitly linked to another Senate-
approved measure banning torture and the abuse of terrorism suspects held 
by the U.S. military. See Weisman, supra note 60. In other words, Congress 
did not intend to slap the courts down for limiting military prerogatives. Con-
gress, instead, sought to put into place its vision of appropriate military deci-
sion making—a vision that spoke both to military overreaching (torture) and 
the risk of frivolous habeas petitions unduly limiting military operations. See 
id. 
 118. Part II focused on the incentives of Republicans to reach out to social 
conservatives. Efforts by Democrats (who controlled the Senate in 2001 and 
2002) to attack “conservative judicial activism” were cut from the same cloth. 
See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text. For an extended treatment, see 
Devins, supra note 77, at 1325–35. 
 119. The arguments that follow would also apply to jurisdiction-stripping 
proposals that might be championed by Democrats—assuming that Democrats 
take over Congress and the White House. For additional discussion, see infra 
note 138. 
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have historically backed judicial independence. For example, 
although most Americans are disappointed with individual Su-
preme Court decisions, there is a “reservoir of support” for the 
power of the Court to independently interpret the Constitu-
tion.120 Consequently, even though some Supreme Court deci-
sions trigger a backlash by those who disagree with the Court’s 
rulings, the American people nonetheless support judicial re-
view and an independent judiciary.121 Indeed, even President 
George W. Bush and Senate majority leader Bill Frist backed 
“judicial independence” after the federal courts refused to chal-
lenge state court factfinding in the Terri Schiavo case.122 
Second, there is an additional cost to lawmakers who want 
to countermand the courts through coercive court-curbing 
measures. Specifically, powerful interest groups sometimes see 
an independent judiciary as a way to protect the legislative 
deals they make.123 In particular, interest groups who invest in 
the legislative process by securing legislation that favors their 
preferences may be at odds with the current legislature or ex-
ecutive (who may prefer judicial interpretations that under-
mine the original intent of the law). Court-curbing measures 
“that impair the functioning of the judiciary” are therefore dis-
favored because they “impose costs on all who use the courts, 
including various politically effective groups and indeed the 
beneficiaries of whatever legislation the current legislature has 
enacted.” 124 
Third (and correspondingly), lawmakers who disapprove of 
court decision making can usually express that disapproval 
without pursuing court-curbing legislation. This is especially 
true of federalism rulings. Rather than foreclose democratic 
outlets, federalism rulings can be circumvented by both Con-
 
 120. Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Sup-
port for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635, 658 (1992). For a good 
overview of the judicial independence literature, see generally Barry Fried-
man, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596 (2003). 
 121. See Friedman, supra note 120, at 2624–29 (discussing, among others, 
Michael Klarman’s work on how Warren Court decision making on race issues 
prompted a political backlash). 
 122. Rather than follow the lead of some members of Congress (most nota-
bly Tom DeLay) and right-to-life interest groups, Bush and Frist thought it 
inappropriate to condemn the courts for refusing to overturn the Florida 
courts. Maura Reynolds, DeLay Tempers His Statements, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 14, 
2005, at A11. 
 123. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judici-
ary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 885 (1975). 
 124. Id. 
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gress and the states.125 Congress can advance the same legisla-
tive agenda by making use of another source of federal power 
and/or enacting a scaled-down version of the bill.126 Interest 
groups, moreover, need not rely exclusively on Congress. They 
can also turn to the states to enact state versions of the very 
law that Congress could not enact.127 Rights-based rulings, in 
contrast, severely limit lawmaker responses. Consider, for ex-
ample, abortion rights. After Roe, neither federal nor state 
lawmakers could regulate abortion in the first trimester.128 
Likewise, Supreme Court decisions on school busing and school 
prayer could not be nullified through legislation.129 At the same 
time, rights-based rulings do not completely foreclose democ-
ratic outlets. Congress can eliminate federal funding and oth-
erwise express its disapproval of the Supreme Court.130 
Fourth, jurisdiction-stripping measures do not nullify Su-
preme Court rulings (or, for that matter, any court ruling). 
Consequently, since proponents of court-stripping cannot count 
on state courts to back their policy agenda, these bills may not 
accomplish all that much.131 Accordingly, interest groups may 
be better off pursuing their substantive agenda through fund-
ing bans, constitutional amendments, the enactment of related 
legislation, and the appointment of judges and Justices. Court-
curbing measures, in contrast, seem more a rhetorical rallying 
call than a roadmap for change. 
 
 
 125. See Neal Devins, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 99 NW. U. L. 
REV. 131, 140–41 (2004). 
 126. See id. at 139–40.  
 127. Perhaps more significantly, interest groups rarely benefit from either 
a narrow or expansive view of congressional power. When Congress enacts leg-
islation that backs its preferences, interest groups benefit from a broad view of 
congressional power. But interest groups benefit from a narrow view of con-
gressional power in seeking to nullify legislation they oppose. See id. at 141. 
 128. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973). 
 129. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 29–31 (1971); 
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424–25 (1962). 
 130. See DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 29, at 40–42, 132–34; supra notes 
52–54 and accompanying text (discussing congressional responses to rights-
based rulings in the 1970s and 1980s). 
 131. State supreme court justices, moreover, do not approve of federal ef-
forts to push divisive federal constitutional issues into state courts. See, e.g., 
128 CONG. REC. 689, 689–90 (1982) (reprinting resolution adopted at the Con-
ference of State Chief Justices). Correspondingly, there is reason to think that 
state supreme courts would be reluctant to facilitate court-curbing legislation 
by backing the agenda of interest groups that challenge federal judicial inde-
pendence. 
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That the Roberts Court need not worry about jurisdiction-
stripping legislation is important, but ultimately does not an-
swer the question of whether the Court should fear Congress. 
Congress, after all, can slap the courts down in other ways.132 
Nevertheless, changes in Congress over the past twenty years 
suggest that the Roberts Court has less reason to fear Congress 
than did the Warren or Burger Courts. As detailed in Part II, 
today’s lawmakers are less engaged in constitutional matters 
and less interested in asserting their prerogative to independ-
ently interpret the Constitution. Correspondingly, lawmakers 
place relatively more emphasis on expressing their opinions 
than on advancing their policy preferences. Consequently, even 
though the Rehnquist Court invalidated more federal statutes 
than any other Supreme Court, Congress did not see the 
Court’s federalism revival as a fundamental challenge to con-
gressional power.133 Lawmakers, instead, preferred to appeal to 
their base by speaking out on divisive social issues—launching 
rhetorical attacks against lower federal courts and state courts. 
Let me close on a cautionary note: the past may not be pro-
logue. Widespread accusations of judicial activism may chip 
away at the Court’s “reservoir of support.”134 That is the intent 
of social conservatives who see the current round of court-
stripping proposals as a way to transform the electorate—so 
that a majority of voters will be comfortable with jurisdiction-
stripping and other attacks on judicial independence.135 More 
significant, there is some reason to think that this campaign is 
changing voter attitudes. A September 2005 poll, for example, 
suggests that a majority of Americans think that “‘judicial ac-
tivism’ has reached the crisis stage, and that judges who ignore 
voters’ values should be impeached.”136 Time will tell whether 
 
 132. See supra note 130 and accompanying text; see also FISHER, supra 
note 21, at 200–30. 
 133. For additional discussion, see Devins, supra note 58, at 448–54, and 
Whittington, supra note 79, at 509–18. 
 134. Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 120, at 636–38. For additional discus-
sion, see supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text. 
 135. See Rosenfeld, supra note 99. 
 136. Martha Neil, Half of U.S. Sees ‘Judicial Activism Crisis,’ A.B.A. J. E-
REPORT, Sept. 30, 2005, http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/s30survey 
.html. This poll was about “judicial activism,” not the Supreme Court. How-
ever, a June 2005 CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll revealed a twenty percent drop 
over five years in people’s approval of the Supreme Court (from sixty-two per-
cent to forty-two percent) and a corresponding twenty percent increase in peo-
ple disapproving of the Supreme Court (from twenty-nine percent to forty-
eight percent). See PollingReport.com, Supreme Court/Judiciary Polls, 
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this poll reflects changing voter attitudes. In the meantime, the 
Roberts Court should recognize that today’s Congress is all 
bark and no bite. Court-bashing is a rhetorical move, a political 
strategy that emphasizes defeat and “harness[es] the energy 
that such defeat stokes” among social—especially religious—
conservatives.137 
There may come a time that the social conservative agenda 
is the dominant agenda of Congress and the White House. 
Were that to happen, the Court would run a great risk if it 
were to buck that agenda. Of course, if that does happen, it is 
likely that the appointments and confirmation process will re-
sult in the appointment of judges and Justices who share the 
beliefs of the social conservative agenda.138 
 
http://www.pollingreport.com/court2.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2006). 
 137. Rosenfeld, supra note 99. 
 138. On the other hand, it is theoretically possible that Democrats will 
soon regain control of the Congress. See Robin Toner, Democrats See Dream of 
‘06 Victory Taking Form, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2005, at A1. Should that hap-
pen, it is possible that Democratic lawmakers would take aim at the Roberts 
Court. Against the backdrop of recent Republican efforts to strip the federal 
courts of jurisdiction, it is conceivable that Democrats too would be willing to 
pursue jurisdiction-stripping measures. And if a Democrat were elected presi-
dent in 2008, it is possible that such court-curbing legislation would be signed, 
not vetoed. At the same time, for reasons detailed in this conclusion, Democ-
rats would probably steer clear of jurisdiction-stripping measures. See infra 
notes 119–31 and accompanying text. 
